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Summary
With the passage of H.R. 5710, to create a new Department of Homeland Security,
Congress has begun discussions regarding the appropriate congressional structure to
conduct oversight and fund the new department.  Section 1503 of the legislation states
the sense of Congress that each chamber should review its committee structure in light
of the reorganization of the executive branch.
Each chamber can decide to retain its current structure, make minor alterations to
its current jurisdictional alignment, make extensive jurisdictional changes, or create new
select or standing committees.  Changes can also be made in the structure of the
Appropriations Committees. This report addresses some of the options currently being
discussed and provides information on legislation in the 107th Congress that attempts to
alter the current committee system.  The report will be updated as events warrant.
Introduction. With the passage of H.R. 5710, Congress might need to address the
issue of which House and Senate committees will have legislative, appropriations, and
oversight authority over the activities and funding of the new department. Specifically,
section 1503 of the measure says, “It is the sense of Congress that each House of
Congress should review its committee structure in light of the reorganization of
responsibilities within the executive branch by the establishment of the Department.” 
Numerous Members have already spoken about possible changes to their chamber’s
committee system.  A number of proposals have been offered in the House and Senate to
establish a new select or standing committee on homeland security, to reorganize the
Appropriations Committees to reflect the new department, or to make other changes in
congressional structures dealing with homeland security issues.  A senior House leader
has observed that creation of the new department “probably will require at least a
reorganization of the current committees.” A Senator active in crafting the final
compromise stated “It is hard to see how Congress could do a decent job of authorizing
and overseeing what the new department does without a new Committee of Homeland
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Security.”  On the other hand, a number of Members have publicly opposed any alteration
of House or Senate committee structures, while others have endorsed or opposed such
action at different times.1   From the perspective of the executive branch, a reduction in
committee jurisdiction fragmentation limits the number of panels to which officials of the
new agency will be answerable.  This report examines various options for the House and
Senate individually or jointly to consider in reorganizing its structures dealing with
homeland security and discusses possible advantages and disadvantages of each.
Options for Congressional Organization
Retain Current Structure. Congress could decide that the current system is
sufficient to monitor the work of the new department.  No changes would be made in
either jurisdiction or referral procedures.  Some may argue that it is too soon to know how
much legislative workload the new department will cause House and Senate committees.
In the immediate aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, all congressional committees
sought involvement in terrorism matters.  If the legislative focus on the issue subsides,
fewer committees might actively seek such involvement. 
However, claims to jurisdiction over the new department are already being made. A
senior member of the Armed Services Committee has been reported to say that the Armed
Services Committee could exercise responsibility for the new department.2  The programs,
activities, and units of the Department of Energy, for example, are currently within the
jurisdiction of more than one committee in each chamber.  Retaining the current
committee structure in either or both chambers could create jurisdictional struggles among
committees claiming to be the “primary” (House) or “predominant” (Senate) committee,
the terms of art in the two chambers signifying a principal or exclusive role over the
department.
Historically, there has been no necessary connection between an executive
reorganization and congressional committee reorganization.  Several House and Senate
committees were combined to create the new Armed Services Committees in 1947, at
about the same time that the Department of Defense was created.  The Armed Services
Committees promptly created subcommittees that closely matched the former standing
committees that had been merged in the committee reorganization.  On the other hand,
the Department of Energy was created after the Senate had consolidated energy
jurisdiction in its committees, but before the House completed a realignment of its energy
jurisdictions in 1980.  The creation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(now Health and Human Services) was not accompanied by any change in House or
Senate committee jurisdictions.    
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Reorganize Entire System.  Either chamber or both chambers, either acting
separately or jointly, could undertake an extensive reorganization of the committee
system.  A substantial House committee reorganization took place in 1995, but it has been
a quarter century since the Senate comprehensively reorganized its committees. The Joint
Committee on the Organization of Congress in the 103rd Congress considered numerous
options for such reorganization, but did not directly address the issue of terrorism or anti-
terrorism jurisdiction.3 A comprehensive reorganization could allow both chambers to
address other jurisdiction issues which have emerged in recent years. 4  Nevertheless, a
comprehensive reorganization is normally controversial and rarely contemplated under
very short deadlines.
Realign Committee Jurisdiction.  Within the existing system, either or both
chambers could choose to realign their committee jurisdictions within the existing
structure. That would entail changing chamber rules.  Past experience indicates that
Members generally have been loathe to overhaul the committee system, especially during
a Congress.  Rules changes are traditionally adopted at the beginning of a new Congress.
In the House, such changes could be drafted after the adjournment of the 107th Congress
and included in the package of rules changes voted on by the House at  the convening of
the108th Congress.  In the Senate, because there is no need to readopt Senate rules at the
beginning of a new Congress, a committee reorganization would have to be  considered
separately. 
In either chamber, it would be possible to add jurisdictional aspects of certain
homeland security topics to the jurisdiction of specific committees, without altering the
existing subject jurisdictions of committees over other topics.  For example, jurisdiction
over “national energy policy generally” was assigned to the House Energy and Commerce
Committee in 1980 without significant alteration to other committees’ jurisdictions.
Change Referral System.  Both chambers generally refer measures to a single
committee, by determining primary jurisdiction in the House and predominant jurisdiction
in the Senate.  In the House, most multiple referrals are sequential, although joint referrals
were permitted until 1995. Changing the referral system could enable all interested
committees to maintain legislative and oversight jurisdiction.  For example, the Speaker
of the House (who has the discretionary authority to impose time limits on referrals) could
be required to impose them on all committees involved in a multiple referral of a
homeland security-related bill.  In addition, for legislation on homeland security, the
House could allow joint referrals.  
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In the Senate, which generally requires unanimous consent for multiple referrals,
party leaders could invoke their little-used authority to recommend referrals to several
committees by debate-limited motion. However, major changes in House or Senate bill
referral rules could complicate action on homeland security matters in the short term and
could be nearly as controversial as a jurisdictional realignment.
Create New Standing Committee over Homeland Security.  A new
standing committee could be created in either or both chambers.  Such a panel could have
legislative responsibility over all aspects of a new Department of Homeland Security.  In
the House, Representative Jim Ryun (R-KS) introduced H.Res. 481 which would create
a standing committee on homeland security, and a new appropriations subcommittee
dealing with homeland security. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) testified before the
House Rules Committee during its hearing on potential rules changes for the 108th
Congress about the need for a new standing committee on homeland security. Questions
regarding whether the new committee would absorb jurisdiction from existing panels or
overlap with them would need to be decided. Would special oversight authority be
granted to a new committee?  Creating a new standing committee would require a change
in chamber rules.  Such changes are traditionally included in opening day House rules
change packages.  In the Senate, no proposal has been introduced to create a new standing
committee on homeland security.
Create Select Committee over Homeland Security.  Members in both the
House and Senate have introduced resolutions to create select committees.  In the House,
Representative J.C. Watts (R-OK) introduced H.Res. 52, which states that Congress
“should establish a panel to examine the adequacy of its committee structure to deal with
issues related to domestic terrorism and to consider the creation of more effective
structures, including a Select Committee on Domestic Terrorism.”  Senator Pat Roberts
(R-KS) introduced S. Res. 165 to create a Select Committee on Homeland Security and
Terrorism, with the panel having “primary and preeminent” jurisdiction over homeland
security and terrorism. The Center for Strategic and International Studies has
recommended, as have other groups, the creation of select committees in each chamber
to conduct oversight over a new Department of Homeland Security.5
Select committees generally are not granted legislative jurisdiction.  If such a new
panel were created, would it have legislative authority (for example, in the same manner
as do the current intelligence committees)?  If so, would other committees receive
sequential referrals of their legislative product, and could the select committee demand
sequential referrals of relevant measures reported from the standing committees?  If such
a select committee were created without legislative jurisdiction, its findings and
recommendations would need to be transferred to one or more standing committees.
Create Leadership Committee.  Similar to the current Select Committee on
Homeland Security, either or both chambers could create a leadership panel to consider
legislation and conduct oversight on the department.  Such a panel could be the first to act
on legislative proposals, with other panels claiming legislative authority acting
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sequentially.  Alternatively, such a panel could act after the relevant panels considered
issues within their jurisdiction, but prior to any legislation being considered on the floor.
A further alternative would be to reconstitute the House Select Committee on Homeland
Security to monitor the agency’s development while decisions are made on more
extensive jurisdictional changes among committees.6
The membership of such panels is typically comprised of the elected party leaders,
or their designees, as is the case with the current House Select Committee on Homeland
Security.  Alternatively, the chairs and ranking members of the committees that would
retain jurisdiction over the issues transferred to the new department (as was the case with
the Ad Hoc Committee on Energy in 1977), or some combination thereof, could also be
named to a leadership committee.  Similarly, the Senate has relied on the so-called Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control (whose members are named by the party
leaders) to monitor executive branch activities in this matter.  Although named a
“caucus,” the panel essentially functions as a non-legislative select committee. 
Use less Formal Means to Coordinate Policy.  In both the House and Senate,
many committees claiming responsibility for specific policy areas have entered into
“memoranda of understanding,” or agreements among the concerned committees,
reflecting each panel’s appropriate jurisdiction over a disputed policy area.  These
memoranda serve as guidance to the parliamentarians’ offices in making bill referrals and
may obviate the immediate need for a formal revision in committee jurisdictions.  
The Senate also makes use of “temporary standing orders,” unanimous consent
agreements typically in force for the current Congress only, that modify the standing rules
of the Senate.  One or more temporary standing orders could be used to allocate
jurisdiction among Senate committees over homeland security issues.  These orders could
be set to expire at the end of the 108th Congress, unless the Senate of the 109th Congress
agreed to retain them.  If successful, the temporary orders could be converted into more
permanent changes in Senate procedure; if not, other realignments could be attempted.
Realign Appropriations Committees’ Subcommittees.  The only panels in
Congress with closely parallel structures are the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees.  Each chamber could create a fourteenth subcommittee on homeland
security, which would have responsibility over the funding for the new department and
the entities transferred to it.  Some within the House Appropriations Committee have
suggested the creation of a fourteenth subcommittee, but there is no consensus.
Representative Jim Ryun (R-KS) introduced H.Res. 481 which calls for the creation of
a new standing committee on homeland security and a new appropriations subcommittee
on homeland security.  In the Senate, there is also some support for the creation of a
separate appropriations subcommittee.7
Alternatively, duties could be redistributed among the existing 13 subcommittees.
Any reorganization of Appropriations subcommittees would not be dependent upon
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the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have had identical subcommittee
structures, but such parallel organization is not required.  The House Appropriations
Committee has historically taken the lead on such organizational questions, with the
Senate committee following in the same or a later Congress.  
Furthermore, the organization of the subcommittees could remain unchanged while
the committee considered new procedures to assemble an appropriations bill for the
Homeland Security Department.  Supplemental appropriations bills are assembled at the
full committee from recommendations put forward by individual subcommittees.  A bill
funding the Homeland Security Department could be assembled from recommendations
put forward by each appropriations subcommittee for homeland security activities within
its jurisdiction.  The separate recommendations could then be consolidated into a free-
standing bill considered only at the full committee. 
Create a Joint Committee on Homeland Security.  The House and Senate
could create a joint committee to oversee the work of a new department.  However, only
one joint committee in the last half-century has been granted legislative jurisdiction.  If
such a joint panel were created, the question of sequential referrals to existing standing
committees could still be raised.  The House and Senate acted separately in the 107th
Congress to permit the two intelligence committees to hold an inquiry into intelligence
failures prior to the terrorist attacks.  Nothing in House or Senate rules would preclude
existing House or Senate committees from holding joint hearings in the interests of
greater efficiency.  Some view joint committees as a means to permit more efficient
congressional review of policy areas, while others believe that separate committees help
preserve chamber autonomy and encourage independent committee initiatives.
